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Siting new disposal facilities in Maine in the 1990s
Maine Policy Review (1992). Volume 1, Number 2
The seeming paralysis in siting waste disposal facilities and other new facilities in Maine and
other states underscores the difficulty of designing and implementing processes that will
safeguard the environment and human health while sustaining economic development. Sherry
Huber, director of the Maine Waste Management Agency, highlights issues that have surfaced
during the initial efforts of MWMA to site a special waste landfill. Don Meagher of the Eastern
Maine Development Corporation describes the lessons learned from his involvement in an effort
to site a demolition debris facility. Bob Dunning, a Bridgton facility siting activist, offers some
suggestions to government and industry officials on how to communicate better with facility
siting opponents. Finally, Michael Cannata, chief engineer of the New Hampshire Public
Utilities Commission, details the steps taken by New Hampshire's leaders to ensure a responsive
facility siting process for new energy projects.

A facility siting activist's view
by Bob Dunning, Self-employed historic restoration carpenter and cabinet maker, Bridgton
Buckminster Fuller, in one of his books, said, "To a drowning man a car hood makes a good life
preserver. But if you have to design the life preserver, it does not necessarily have to look like a
car hood." That is the situation where we are right now. We have a vision of a facility siting
process that we have had in the past. To make progress, we need to step back, to re-evaluate, to
determine exactly what we want to do, and then to design a process to do it.
I call myself a facility siting activist. In some situations that will be participant; in some
situations that is opponent. It is not always one or the other. When the Department of Energy
(DOE) was here to attempt to site a high-level waste facility in 1986, I was an opponent because
of the lack of trust in the DOE, lack of trust in their concept of deep geologic burial and belief in
the unsuitability of the area. In the case of the GWEN Towers, the effort by the Air Force to site
Ground-Wave Emergency Network towers in Maine, I opposed them because of lack of belief in
the need. At the time, the Soviet Union was crumbling, and we did not really need those
facilities. On other issues, such as low-level waste disposal and special waste landfills, I have
taken more of a participant-type viewpoint. Parenthetically, I have the distinction of being just
about the only person in Maine who will publicly state that he believes a low-level waste dump
could obtain the sixty percent approval vote by the host community that is required under current
legislation.
I would like to address the issue of facility siting paralysis from the perspective of the citizen
who is confronted with a proposal for an unwanted facility in his or her neighborhood. This is
often the source of the most obstinate and effective opposition to proposed facilities. It has been
my observation that municipal opposition and, often, dramatic shifts in state policies will follow
from effective and intense citizen opposition. I will go a bit afield for a while, but I will return
with some recommendations to address neighborhood opposition through improvements in the
siting process.

Sources of local opposition
First, I would like to address the expectation by some siting proponents that neighborhood
activists will exhibit the characteristics of the dreaded "NIMBY syndrome." To the credit of
Maine agencies, primarily the Maine Waste Management Agency and the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Authority, they have almost never used that term. They have really
endeavored to treat the public with polite respect and attention. That is not always the case. To
people on my side of the fence, the NIMBY term is rather insulting. It is demeaning and it
minimizes the concerns of people. The term conjures up images of neighborhoods eager to see a
facility sited in any neighborhood but theirs, and it conjures up images of neighborhood activists
who are reluctant to face the facts as presented by facility proponents. In fact, neighborhood
activists almost never work to drive a proposed facility toward another community. Rather, siting
processes generally create a deep empathy and a sense of cooperation among the communities
targeted in a site search.
By contrast, on the issue of low-level radioactive waste disposal, there has been far more of a
NIMBY attitude expressed by the Maine Legislature and the Governor's Office than by any
community targeted by the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Authority. "Maine is not suitable." "It
is not dry enough." Those are NIMBY-type concerns. Communities want to address the
generation issues and the equity issues. When facing the facts as presented by facility
proponents, neighborhood activists have shown an uncanny ability to wade through reams of
technical data and to focus on the most faulty assumptions of the siting proponents. The current
paralysis in facility siting may have more to do with those faulty technical issues than with some
mysterious new capability of neighborhood activists to frustrate siting activities.
In any other context, except siting controversies, neighborhood activism is seen as a virtue and is
praised as democracy in action. Town government, school activities, project DARE, and working
to get people peddling drugs out of the community - these are democracy in action. But
somehow fighting for your community is not. The EPA has estimated that there are as many as
25,000 to 30,000 sites in our nation eligible for consideration as Superfund sites. If these were
spread out evenly across America, there would be one every 11 to 12 miles in every direction.
Facility failure is common in America; people hear of it every day. Any reasonably wellinformed citizen can be expected to be wary when a facility is proposed for their neighborhood,
especially if they have knowledge of a similar facility failing somewhere before. Any business or
state agency seeking to site a facility will be running not just on their own record, but also on the
record of all those other existing facilities of the same type. Even new state agencies, such as the
Maine Waste Management Agency or the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Authority, will be
starting not at square one but several steps behind square one.
Citizens have seen three ways that facilities have failed. The first is by acts of God, like the
recent break in the sewage pipe in San Diego. These are seen as wild cards that can rarely be
defended against. They are the most unpredictable cause of facility failure but, ironically, they
are often the easiest to fix. The second cause of facility failure is illegal action, where facility
design or operations have not followed regulation or law. The deplorable way our Department of
Energy has operated nuclear weapons facilities in eight states has damaged not only the
environment and public health but also has severely affected the public perception of motive.

Citizens believe that those who site facilities have their own agenda and that public protection is
not necessarily very high on that agenda. That lack of trust often extends to business. The third,
and by far the largest, cause of facility failure and consequent environmental degradation is the
inadequacy of government regulation. Past regulations and laws have simply not protected our
environment.
The scientific method is an excellent way to establish facts and accumulate a body of knowledge.
It is a lousy way to enforce social justice. Yet, increasingly, public regulation is a codification of
the current state of scientific knowledge. Consider for example the breast implant issue. Twenty
years could have been spent establishing data, and yet we are suddenly forced to decide whether
it is appropriate or not. Or consider radioactive protection measures. In 1980, it was discovered
that the A-bomb data was faulty and that far less radiation (ten times less radiation) had caused
the same number of cancers. Therefore, radiation was ten times more dangerous than previously
suspected. It was not until 1990 that the National Academy of Sciences addressed the issue and
finally lowered the standards. What about all the people who were exposed to the higher levels in
these ten years?
Underground steel fuel storage tanks are now recognized as a tremendous danger to
groundwater, but when installed they were legal. Leaking municipal landfills, leaking radioactive
waste facilities, and the larger issues of acid rain, ozone depletion and global warming, are all the
result of legal activities. There may well be new efforts to address past failures and to set more
stringent regulation, but citizens have little reason to believe that even the newest governmental
regulations adequately protect them from unwanted consequences. Public trust is difficult to
earn, but it is easy to lose.
Local values and the siting process
Let me now return to neighborhood opposition to new facilities. Government and industry view
environmental issues as legal issues. Forty-nine parts per million is legal, 50 parts per million is
illegal. Neighborhood activists view these issues as value questions. "If 50 is bad for me, how
can you expose my family to 49?" Or again, government says, "If we take this land by eminent
domain, it will cost X dollars per acre." A landowner says, "My father planted that apple tree and
I had these specific dreams for my land." Yet again, the government says, "By law we must have
a site for this facility." The neighborhood activist says, "Who is benefiting from this facility
while my neighborhood has changed forever?" Ironically, should citizens place values in dollars
on those things that are important to them, they demean them. If they say, "That is the cemetery
where my grandfather is buried, but for eminent domain purposes, I will sell it for $5,000," it
goes against the grain of what is important to people.
When a facility is proposed, neighbors are usually first stirred by these value questions. They
feel the unfairness, the lack of trust, the threat to neighborhood and the threat of destruction of
natural beauty. They soon learn that these issues are peripheral at best to those siting a facility.
The neighbors then begin to examine the particular siting characteristics of their site versus other
proposed sites. If those characteristics are unsuitable at their site, such as sensitive wetlands or
poor soil conditions, their opinion of the technical competence of the siting agency falls. Where
siting characteristics such as low population favor their site over others, it gives them the feeling

of political weakness. A profound paranoia often sets in and neighborhood activists see their site
as the inevitable choice. In either of these circumstances, but especially the latter, a fierce resolve
to oppose the entire siting process is born.
Those of you who were in Maine in 1986 may remember how we felt when the DOE was in
town: Powerful, empowered, important. We were saving "our neighborhood." There is a fierce,
good feeling in that Activists have that feeling wherever they are, even on smaller issues.
Trust is a function of actions that are good. In the absence of trust, control is a pretty good
substitute. If I do not trust you, but I feel that I have control over the situation, I can deal with it.
By ceding some control, you can then encourage trust. At least it gives you that window of
opportunity. That is why we need to get back to people in communities. Along with privilege
comes responsibility. In our communities today, those two are very widely divorced. They do
need to be brought together. But I also am optimistic and I believe that people will accept that. If
they understand that Joe Peer is going to lose his job if he does not have some place to put his
special waste and we need those jobs in town, they will figure out some way to handle it, the best
possible way to handle it.
Government and industry will not crack the problem of neighborhood opposition to facility siting
unless and until they address these issues in the way neighborhoods address them. We must be
much more aggressive in eliminating the need for new facilities. New facilities must be proven to
be the real, last recourse. That may well mean compromises at the policy level that do not please
some business and industry interests. Nevertheless, the status quo is not meeting either the public
or the private interest. Second, we must recognize that past laws and regulations have failed to
protect the public and the environment. New regulations must satisfy a much higher level of
public protection and public expectation. Regulation and enforcement must be designed, not just
to meet some acceptable level of risk, but to re-establish trust in the government's willingness
and capability to protect the public. Third, industry ought to aggressively police itself. Every
time a company breaks an environmental law or fails to be a good corporate citizen, it affects a
host of other corporate images. Distrust is highly transferable. Fourth, public attitudes regarding
permanent disposal have changed markedly in the last decade. Avoiding the risk of future facility
failure by building in remediation capability is given a higher value than the benefits of
attempting permanent disposal. Siting efforts must begin at the earliest possible moment to
incorporate those public interests. Lastly, we must find some way to measure and consider
neighborhood values in the siting process.
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